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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of jurisdiction is an essential legal question. "The foundation
of jurisdiction is physical power."' When a court lacks jurisdiction, it is void
of the inherent power to decide a case.2 One particular form of jurisdiction,
* The author is a graduate of Vassar College and a spring 2006 J.D. candidate from
Nova.
1. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
2. Johnson v. McKinnon, 45 So. 23, 25 (Fla. 1907). Early Roman notions of jurisdic-
tional procedure were by "voluntary" submission. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule
of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296
(1956). "Inducement and force" were the jurisdictional tools of later Roman courts. Id. Ju-
1
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personal jurisdiction, has been a topic of controversy and litigation since
before courts existed in America.' The primary inquiry involved in these
disputes is whether the court has the power to hale a particular defendant into
that court, subject them to proceedings, and enforce the will of the court and
the court's judgment upon him or her.4
However, as complicated as personal jurisdictional issues may become,
when these controversies intersect with other jurisdictional issues, the scope
of the litigation tends to become even more confusing and problematic. In-
deed, another form of jurisdiction which may add to this morass is appellate
jurisdiction. "Appellate jurisdiction is the power to take cognizance of and
review proceedings in an inferior court... ," Thus, when issues of personal
jurisdiction intersect and collide with issues of appellate jurisdiction, the
difficulties faced by litigants and courts are amplified.
In Thomas v. Silvers,6 the Supreme Court of Florida faced such a tan-
gled web.7 This paper will focus on Thomas and its interpretation of the in-
tersection of personal jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. The procedural
technicalities underlying the legal framework for the Thomas decision are
intricate, and therefore it is necessary to provide substantial background on
the relevant law. Thus, part II of this paper will summarize the substantive
elements of personal jurisdiction and their relation to service of process. Part
II will also illustrate essential differences in the nature of motions to quash
service. Part III of this paper will briefly summarize the history and purpose
of the intermediate courts in Florida, the district courts of appeal. Addition-
ally, part III will examine the scope of appellate jurisdiction in Florida. Part
IV of this paper will discuss the mechanics of the writ of certiorari and the
interlocutory appeal, and will demonstrate how these tools are used in con-
nection with issues of personal jurisdiction. Part V of this paper will assess
the case history behind the ultimate decision in Thomas by exploring the
delicate balance between appellate jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and
risdiction in American courts is based on the Constitution of the United Sates. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
3. Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi
in Rem andIn Personam Principles, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1147, 1148 (1978).
4. Richard W. Garnett, Once More Into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-
Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433,
438 (1996) (citing A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 944 (8th Cir. 1996)) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (noting in the dissent that "the power to adjudicate everyday disputes occurring
within a nation's own territory is among the most basic and indispensable manifestations of
sovereign power").
5. Williams v. State ex rel. Nuccio, 122 So. 523, 524 (Fla. 1929).
6. 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
7. Id.
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how subtle decisions in one realm can produce adverse, unforeseen effects in
the other. Part VI of this paper will focus on Thomas itself, and will explain
how the Supreme Court of Florida resolved the conflict between the district
courts of appeal. Specifically, part VI will look to a recent amendment to the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and show how this change makes the deci-
sion in Thomas an equitable one. Finally, part VI will explore additional
policy reasons supporting the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Tho-
mas. Part VII will conclude by stating that Thomas was correctly decided
because time limits for service should not be construed as an essential ele-
ment of personal jurisdiction.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Service of Process and Its Relation to Personal Jurisdiction
"Jurisdiction is simply power.",8 A primary form of territorial jurisdic-
tion is personal, or in personam, jurisdiction.9 Personal jurisdiction is the
power of a court to compel a party to litigate and enforce judgment upon that
party in that particular forum.° Under Garrett v. Garrett, II Florida's "power
to exercise personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution., 12 For a court to
have personal jurisdiction over a party in Florida, the party must meet certain
criteria.
These criteria are: 1) being physically present in the state of Florida; 3
2) having status as a Florida domiciliary; 14 3) having previously agreed to
8. Johnson, 45 So. at 25.
9. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL
175 (Univ. Casebook Series ed., 8th ed. 1999). The other major forms of territorial jurisdic-
tion are in rem jurisdiction and quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id. These forms of territorial juris-
diction concern property. Id. Although each is important in their own right, a discussion of
these forms of jurisdiction is outside the scope of this discussion.
10. Johnson, 45 So. at 25.
11. 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996).
12. Id. at 993 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108
(1987)).
13. See generally Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257-58 (Fla. 2002) (discussing
acts which subject a party to personal jurisdiction in Florida in the absence of physical pres-
ence); see also Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (holding that a Cali-
fornia court's exertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who was physically present
"constitutes due process").
14. Perez v. Perez, 164 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (noting that to
establish domicile for the purpose of asserting personal jurisdiction, the defendant must have a
2004]
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submit to jurisdiction by contract; 5 4) waiving objections to the assertion of
jurisdiction; 6 5) submitting voluntarily to jurisdiction; 7 or 6) possessing
minimum contacts. 8 The minimum contacts test in Florida is somewhat
elaborate and requires further explanation.
Under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 9 a prospective party must
have "certain minimum contacts with [Florida] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' 20 An additional requirement under International Shoe Co. is articu-
lated in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.21 Under Woodson, a
court can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant
"purposefully avails"' 22 himself or herself of the laws of Florida and when the
assertion of personal jurisdiction is "reasonable. 23 Finally, the court will
apply the balancing test provided by Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz2 This
test evaluates: 1) "the burden on the defendant"; 2) "the forum State's inter-
est in adjudicating the dispute"; 3) "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining con-
venient and effective relief"; 4) "the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies"; and 5) "the shared
residence in Florida coupled with the intent to remain in Florida or for an "indefinite period')
(citations omitted)).
15. Vacation Ventures, Inc. v. Holiday Promotions, Inc., 687 So. 2d 286, 288-89 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (cautioning that although parties my subject themselves to personal
jurisdiction through contract, forum selection clauses must also satisfy Florida's long-arm
statute and meet the minimum contacts test).
16. FLA. R. CwV. P. 1.140(h)(2) (ordering that a jurisdictional defense is waived unless
raised by motion, answer, or reply).
17. Beverly Beach Props., Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1953) (noting that the
assertion of personal jurisdiction may be acquired through the voluntary appearance of a
party).
18. Harris v. Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.C., 831 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)) (noting that
the federal due process test for minimum contacts must be satisfied for the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction).
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Since Florida courts are bound by decisions from the United
States Supreme Court, these tests have been adopted in Florida. See Nat'l Alcoholism Pro-
grams v. Slocum, 648 So. 2d 234, 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Venetian Salami
Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)) (holding that the requirements of the
minimum contacts test and Florida's long-arm statute must be satisfied for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant).
20. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
21. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
23. Id. at 292 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317).
24. 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
[Vol. 29:1:75
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interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.
25
As this "minimum contacts" test is applied to non-resident defendants,
there is an additional requirement. Courts must look to Florida's long-arm
statute2 6 to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is legislatively authorized.27 Not only must it be fair to subject a
prospective party to a suit in Florida, but this prospective party must also be
informed of the pending litigation.
In order to be informed of the pending litigation, the party must be
properly served.28 In the absence of proper service of process, a judgment is
void.29 The Supreme Court of Florida held that "the real purpose of the ser-
vice of summons ad respondendum is to give proper notice to the defendant
in the case that he is answerable to the claim of plaintiff and, therefore, to
vest jurisdiction in the court entertaining the controversy.'3O In Bedford
Computer Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc.,3 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that
[t]he object of process is to warn the defendant that an action or
proceeding has been commenced against him by the plaintiff, that
he must appear within a time and at a place named and make such
defense as he has, and that, in default of his so doing, a judgment
will be asked or taken against him in a designated sum or for the
other relief specified.32
25. Id. (quoting Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292).
26. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2003).
27. Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 n.4 (Fla.
2000) (noting assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant must fall within
statutorily proscribed provision of section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes).
28. Valdosta Milling Co. v. Garretson, 54 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. 1951).
29. Id. (holding "[n]otice and an opportunity to defend is fundamental in our jurispru-
dence"); see also Taylor v. Bowles, 570 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
((citing Li v. Li, 442 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)) (holding "[w]hen a party
has no notice of a trial date, the trial court abuses its discretion when it proceeds with a final
hearing and enters final judgment")).
30. Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 1959) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing State ex rel. Merritt v. Heffeman, 195 So. 145, 147 (Fla. 1940)); see also Shepard v.
Kelly, 2 Fla. 634, 655 (1849) ("[A] summons, regularly served, as required by the [statute or
rules], gives the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.").
31. 484 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1986).
32. Id. at 1227 (citing Gribbel v. Henderson, 10 So. 2d 734, 739 (Fla. 1942)). See also
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
2004]
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Thus, the form of service of process is also significant as it is central to
process' purpose: notice.33 When a party believes that service of process has
not been perfected in compliance with the relevant provisions, the party may
file a motion to quash service.
B. Essential Differences in the Nature of Motions to Quash Service
In Florida, motions to quash service of process may be filed either in an
answer or before a responsive pleading.34 As one of the seven enumerated
defenses of rule 1.140(b)35 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the de-
fense of "lack of jurisdiction over the person"3 6 may be raised by motion.
Pursuant to section 48.031 (1)(a) 37 of the Florida Statutes,
[s]ervice of original processes is made by delivering a copy of it to
the person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or
other initial pleading or paper or by leaving the copies at his or her
usual place of abode with any person residing therein who is 15
years of age or older and informing the person their contents. Mi-
nors who are or have been married shall be served as provided in
this section.38
As previously discussed, service of process is an essential element of
personal jurisdiction. Without valid service, the court cannot exercise juris-
diction over the person. 39 Thus, when service of process does not purport-
edly comply with the relevant procedural guidelines of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, the issue of "lack of jurisdiction over the person ' is val-
idly raised. These motions to quash service allege deficiencies in the pur-
ported service of process upon the party. Yet in the realm of jurisdiction
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." (citations
omitted)).
33. Bedford Computer Corp., 484 So. 2d at 1227. Personal service is the preferred form
of service of process. Id. The Florida Statutes also provide for substitute service, but it is less
preferred because it is less likely to effect the goal of process. Id.
34. See Viking Superior Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co., 212 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1968) (noting that express statutory construction of rule 1.140 authorizes defenses to
service of process to be made prior to a responsive pleading).
35. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.140(b).
36. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.140(b)(2).
37. FLA. STAT. § 48.03 1(1)(a) (2003).
38. Id.
39. See Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla 1959).
40. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(2).
41. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) ("The grounds on which any of the enumerated defenses...
shall be stated specifically and with particularity in the responsive pleading or motion.").
[Vol. 29:1:75
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over the person, these allegations of insufficiency of process span a wide
scope of legal reasoning.
On the one hand, the alleged deficiencies pursuant to section
48.031 (2)(a)41 of the Florida Statutes might point to the fact that the defen-
dant was improperly served because the process was delivered to an address
where the defendant did not reside.43 Likewise, the deficiency alleged could
be that a person not authorized to accept service on behalf of the defendant
was served and therefore, the purported service was invalid.' On the other
hand, the alleged deficiency could be that the plaintiff failed to serve the
defendant within the 120-day time limit as provided by rule 1.070(j). 45
All of these alleged deficiencies, if proven, would violate a provision of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and could warrant service of process to
be quashed.46 This paper will argue that violating the time requirement of
rule 1.0706) 47 is fundamentally different from violating the other provisions.
Rule 1.0700)" is different because it fails to go to the essential requirement
of service of process: notice. The fact that service is late pursuant to rule
1.0700) 49 does not mean that the party did not receive notice. It is simply
late notice. In contrast, the other violations mentioned all go to the essential
nature of service of process. A party who is unauthorized to receive service
of process may have an ulterior motive. Specifically, an estranged husband
may not inform the former wife of the pending litigation.5" Likewise, deliv-
ering service upon someone who is unauthorized by section 48.031(2)(a)5 to
receive service goes to the essence of notice because the unauthorized person
may neither appreciate the gravity of the documents nor care about the po-
tential defendant's welfare. In turn, the unauthorized person may not inform
the true party against whom the litigation is pending.
42. § 48.03 1(2)(a) ("Substitute service may be made on the spouse of the person to be
served ... if the spouse and person to be served are residing together in the same dwelling.").
43. Montero v. DuVal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Jacksonville, 581 So. 2d 938, 939 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that substituted service upon wife at estranged husband's
home when she did not reside there was invalid).
44. Berne v. Beznos, 819 So. 2d 235, 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that as
concierge of apartment building was not a person who resided at the apartment building, con-
cierge was unauthorized to receive service of process for defendant and service of process
should have been quashed).
45. See Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263, 263 (Fla. 1999).
46. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Montero, 581 So. 2d at 939.
51. § 48.031(2)(a).
2004]
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This distinction between these rule violations is crucial. As such, the
Florida District Courts of Appeal are weary of entertaining all interlocutory
appeals and must distinguish between them as the Supreme Court of Florida
did in Thomas.52 Yet, in order to understand the context in which these inter-
locutory appeals occur, it is necessary to further expand upon appellate juris-
diction in Florida.
III. THE APPELLATE SYSTEM IN FLORIDA
Florida created a two-tier appellate system in 1956. 53 Previous to this
amendment to the Florida Constitution, only the Supreme Court of Florida
conducted appellate review of trial court cases.54 The need for additional
courts arose because the workload of the court system in Florida became
unmanageable.55 Additionally, commentators have suggested that appellate
courts in Florida, as well as in other states, came into existence partially to
correct "routine error.,5 6 With the more rudimentary tasks apportioned to
these mid-level courts, the highest court in the state can concentrate on more
important and urgent legal issues.57 However, even today a significant con-
sideration in constructing effective judicial administration is creating a sys-
tem that effectively and efficiently apportions workloads.58
Thus, an ideal goal of judicial administration is crafting a framework in
which justice is done and the justices maintain manageable dockets. Two of
the methods employed to achieve this goal are limiting what issues are ap-
pealable and limiting when they are appealable.59 To adequately describe
this process, it is necessary to explore the definition of appellate jurisdiction.
"Appellate jurisdiction is the power to take cognizance of and review
proceedings in an inferior court."60 In Florida, state appellate court jurisdic-
tion is statutorily proscribed.6' Jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal
52. See generally Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
53. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 5 (1957).
54. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate
Courts: A Comparison of Florida's System with Those of the Other States and the Federal
System, 45 FLA. L. REv. 21, 62 (1993).
55. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 16A-B (1955) (providing for additional county judges for
expanding county populations).
56. Cope, supra note 54, at 33.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 77 (discussing Florida's appellate practice of issuing affirmances without a
written opinion as necessary to manage the workload).
59. See FLA. R. APp. P. 9.130.
60. Williams v. State ex rel. Nuccio, 122 So. 523, 524 (Fla. 1929).
61. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b).
[Vol. 29:1:75
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typically only becomes operative once a final judgment on the merits of the
case is entered.62 In other words, even if a litigant believes that the trial court
has committed an error in ruling on a particular motion or other proceeding,
the ruling is typically not directly appealable until judgment has been en-
tered.63 Simply put: litigants will have to wait to appeal until "all judicial
labor in the case has come to an end."'
This situation often subjects litigants to unnecessary expenditures of
time and money because they may be involved in proceedings that they
should not have been compelled to participate in at all. However, relief is
available from this apparent inequity. Specifically, the judicial mechanisms
of the writ of certiorari and the interlocutory appeal exist for litigants to gain
relief from such adverse rulings, even before a final judgment on the merits
has been entered.
IV. APPELLATE RELIEF PRIOR TO FINAL JUDGMENT
A. An Overview
The Florida district courts of appeal provide mechanisms that allow liti-
gants to appeal adverse rulings before a final judgment on the merits has
been entered. Two commonly employed mechanisms for this purpose are
the common-law writ of certiorari65 and the interlocutory appeal.
66
A threshold question for any litigant wishing to appeal an adverse ruling
at the trial level is where to pursue that appeal. In Florida's two-tier appel-
late system, a narrow class of appeals is heard directly by the Supreme Court
of Florida.67 However, the majority of appeals are heard by the district
courts of appeal.68
62. FLA. CONST. art.V, § 4(b)(1)-(2); FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1).
63. FLA. CONST. art.V, § 4(b)(1)-(2); FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1). See also Mary Piccard
Vance & Ann M. Piccard, Direct Appeal Jurisdiction of Florida's District Courts of Appeal,
33 STETSONL. REv. 153, 154-55 (2003).
64. Vance & Piccard, supra note 63, at 157; See also FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(h); Howard v.
Ziegler, 40 So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. 1949) ("A judgment is final when it adjudicates the merits of
the cause and disposes of the pending action, leaving nothing further to be done but the execu-
tion of the judgment." (citations omitted)).
65. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2).
66. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B).
67. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a) (providing for the jurisdictional scope of the Supreme Court
of Florida).
68. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b).
2004]
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The right to appeal in Florida is not express, but has been constructively
inferred from the Florida Constitution.69 The original Florida Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure provided appellate relief before a final judgment on the
merits through the writ of certiorari.7" These rules also provided for
"[a]ppeals from interlocutory orders ... relating to ... jurisdiction over the
person" to be "prosecuted in accordance with this rule."'" The distinction
between the two is significant because the grant of a writ of certiorari is more
difficult to obtain than the reversal of an interlocutory order.
B. The Writ of Certiorari
The classic procedure used to gain relief before final judgment is en-
tered is the common-law writ of certiorari.72 A writ of certiorari is "[a]n ex-
traordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a
lower court to deliver the record in the case for review."73 However, these
writs are rarely granted.74
Writs of certiorari are seldom granted because the burden of proof
borne by the litigant seeking this extraordinary relief is high.75 Specifically,
appellate courts will grant the writ only when: "(1) the trial court departed
from the essential requirements of the law; (2) the departure resulted in mate-
rial injury that will affect the remainder of the proceedings below; and (3) the
departure cannot be corrected through any other means. 76 Thus, unless a
litigant meets this heavy burden, the litigant will have to wait until the con-
clusion of the trial and directly appeal the adverse ruling. By that time, the
damage may have already been done.
This situation creates unfairness to litigants because by being forced to
continue the trial, they are subjected to unnecessary cost and inconven-
ience.77 This cost and inconvenience is unnecessary because had the ruling
been directly appealable, the appellate court could have stepped in and cor-
69. Hala A. Sandridge, Decisions, Decisions: How the Initial Choice of a State or Fed-
eral Forum May Limit Appellate Remedies, 33 STETSON L. REv. 125, 126-27 (2003).
70. FLA. R. App. P. 4.5(a)(1), (c) (1957).
71. FLA. R. APp.P.4.2(a) (1957).
72. Tracy E. Leduc, Certiorari in the Florida District Courts of Appeal, 33 STETSON L.
REv. 107, 108 (2003).
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
74. Leduc, supra note 72, at 108. Leduc suggests interdependency between certiorari and
rule 9.130 in that they "expand and contract as changes in the law occur." Id. at 124.
75. See id. at 108.
76. Id.
77. Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1987); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995).
[Vol. 29:1:75
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rected the error, if any, and the trial could have then proceeded properly.7"
Yet judicial economy outweighed these apparent inequities.79 This overbur-
dening of the district courts of appeal compelled the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida to amend the Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1977 to narrow the scope
of appealable issues through interlocutory orders."0 Still, the easier route to
correct error, that is, if your class of appeal is statutorily proscribed, is the
interlocutory appeal.
C. Interlocutory Appeals
Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure governs "non-
final orders."'" Appeals of non-final orders are more commonly known as
interlocutory appeals. Interlocutory appeals perhaps neatly fall into the cate-
gory of judicial work, which is properly categorized as routine because they
often correct simple trial court errors.82
Yet as much as every litigant would desire an immediate remedy for
perceived errors at trial, the district courts of appeal would be overburdened
if they were called upon to verify every questionable ruling.83 Additionally,
if the appellate jurisdictional scope of interlocutory appeals was extended to
every minute issue, speedy determinations of trials would perhaps become
non-existent.8 4 Thus, the district courts of appeal in Florida command lim-
ited jurisdiction over non-final orders.85
Unless the nature of the non-final order falls within the statutorily pro-
scribed categories, the district courts of appeal lack jurisdiction to hear the
78. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 1984).
79. Id. (noting the 1977 amendment was intended to preserve judicial resources).
80. See Amends. to the Fla. R. of App. P., 696 So. 2d 1103, 1127 (Fla. 1996). The fol-
lowing committee notes discuss the amended rule:
1977 Amendment. This rule replaces former rule 4.2 and substantially alters current practice.
This rule applies to review of all non-final orders, except those entered in criminal cases, and
those specifically governed by rules 9.100 and 9.110.
The advisory committee was aware that the common law writ of certiorari is available at any
time and did not intend to abolish that writ. However, because that writ provides a remedy
only if the petitioner meets the heavy burden of showing that a clear departure from the essen-
tial requirements of law has resulted in otherwise irreparable harm, it is extremely rare that er-
roneous interlocutory rulings can be corrected by resort to common law certiorari. It is antici-
pated that because the most urgent interlocutory orders are appealable under this rule, there
will be very few cases in which common law certiorari will provide relief.
Id.
81. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130.
82. See Cope, supra note 54.
83. Bruns, 443 So. 2d at 961.
84. See id.
85. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B).
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appeal.86 In Florida's civil courts, 8 7 the district courts of appeal have juris-
diction pursuant to rule 9.130 over interlocutory appeals that:
(A) concern venue;
(B) grant, continue, modify, deny, or dissolve injunctions, or re-
fuse to modify or dissolve injunctions;
(C) determine
(i) the jurisdiction of the person;
(ii) the right to immediate possession of property;
(iii) the right to immediate monetary relief or child custody in
family law matters;
(iv) the entitlement of a party to arbitration;
(v) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to workers'
compensation immunity;
(vi) that a class should be certified; or
(vii) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or
qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal
law;
(D) grant or deny the appointment of a receiver, and terminate or
refuse to terminate a receivership.
88
A fair characterization of rule 9.130 is that the nature of these rulings
goes to the initial quality of the proceedings. If this initial and essential qual-
ity is erroneously determined at the outset of the proceedings, then judicial
resources will be wasted correcting errors and litigants may be substantially
inconvenienced.89
86. See id.
87. FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.130(a)(2). "Appeals of non-final orders in criminal cases shall be as
prescribed by rule 9.140." Id.
88. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(3).
89. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130 Committee Notes (stating "the purpose of these items is to
eliminate useless labor").
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For example, venue determines where litigation will occur.9° As a prac-
tical matter, erroneous determinations of venue may cause significant incon-
venience to the adversely affected party. 9' Thus, such rulings are immedi-
ately appealable pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(A) because if a litigant is forced
to wait until the conclusion of the trial to appeal this order, then the relief
sought would be moot. The trial has already occurred, and the adversely
affected litigant has already sustained the damage caused by the inconvenient
venue.
Likewise, orders that determine jurisdiction of the person are subject to
interlocutory appeals. 92 Without the interlocutory mechanism for relief, a
party who was not originally subject to personal jurisdiction of the court
would have to wait until the trial was concluded to seek relief. However, the
issue of what constitutes an order that determines "jurisdiction of the person"
is not expressly stated in rule 9.130.
93
The classic elements of personal jurisdiction, such as minimum con-
tacts94 and notice,95 are certainly within this rule's scope. Yet in Florida,
there is a time limit on serving a potential party. 96 A violation of this pro-
scribed time limit typically results in a dismissal of the claim without preju-
dice.97 Thus, there arises the issue of whether a violation of the proscribed
time limit for service of process constitutes a question involving "jurisdiction
of the person."98 To provide a potential answer to this question, it is neces-
sary to show how a particular decision on one of the rules involved, rule
1.070(j), 99 can have a ripple effect on the focus of this inquiry. Having set
the legal framework in which this controversy arises, this paper will now
90. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(A). See also Bus. Aide Computers, Inc. v. Cent. Fla.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 432 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing for interlocu-
tory appeal on the issue of venue pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(A)).
91. See generally Kinney Sys. Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996) (discuss-
ing Florida's doctrine of forum non conveniens).
92. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
93. Id.
94. Wartski v. Sencer, 615 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding an
order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm
statute and minimum contacts is appealable pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i)).
95. Allan v. Hill, 502 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding the appellate
court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) be-
cause "the [trial] court in effect ruled against Allan's claims of immunity from service of
process and improper service of process").
96. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700).
97. Id. (directing the trial court to dismiss the action "without prejudice" for violations).
98. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
99. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700).
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proceed to discuss the case law relevant to interlocutory appeals based on
claims of untimely service of process.
V. THE CAUSE OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp.
In Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp.,"' the Supreme Court of Florida con-
sidered "the consequences of failing to obtain service of process within 120
days of the filing of a complaint as required by Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.0700) when no good cause for this failure is demonstrated." "' In
Morales, the plaintiff served Sperry's resident agent four days after the 120-
day allowance for service had expired. 0 2 The circuit court dismissed the
complaint based on the plaintiffs failure to serve process within 120 days of
filing the complaint. °3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed." 4
On review, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the dismissal be-
cause the plaintiff had failed to "meet the burden of demonstrating diligence
and good cause"' °5 to justify the lateness of the service.10 6 This court also
noted that the trial court had "broad discretion in declining to dismiss an ac-
tion if reasonable cause for the failure to effect timely service is docu-
mented."'0 7 Specifically, this court opined that absent this showing of good
cause, permitting any untimely service to be valid "would for practical pur-
poses, negate rule 1.0700) and the reason for its existence."'0 8 The policy
100. 601 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1992).
101. Id. at 538.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Morales, 601 So. 2d at 539.
106. Id. at 539 (noting that a comparison with federal rule 4(m) is applicable as the Florida
rule is modeled on the federal rule); see also United States v. Ayer, 857 F.2d 881, 885 (1st
Cir. 1988) (holding that the corresponding federal rule's mandates may be relaxed after "scru-
tinizing plaintiff s efforts" in affecting service); Lovelace v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 820 F.2d 81,
84 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the corresponding federal rule for service must be "strictly
applied" in the absence of a show of "good cause for the delay" from the plaintiff), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987). See contra Tevdorachvili v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 103 F. Supp.
2d 632, 639 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the 1993 amendments to rule 4(m) broadens the
trial judge's discretion and allows district courts to "grant relief from rule 4(m), even in the
absence of good cause shown").
107. Morales, 601 So. 2d at 540.
108. Id.
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underpinning the rule is to demand "diligent prosecution of lawsuits once a
complaint is filed."'0 9
Thus, this ruling would provide incentive for plaintiffs to comply with
the mandates of rule 1.070 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet this
ruling would have consequences in other, perhaps unforeseen, areas as well.
Specifically, this ruling would affect a later decision on the scope of appel-
late jurisdiction in Florida.
B. The Root of Conflict: Comisky on Morales
In Comisky v. Rosen Management Service, Inc.,"0 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal considered en banc"' the question of whether denials of
motions to quash service based on claims that service was untimely consti-
tute appealable orders." 2 Specifically, the issue addressed was whether un-
timely service pursuant to rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure falls within the parameters of "an 'order determining jurisdiction of the
person"' of rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure."3 The 5-4 majority in Comisky relied heavily on Morales 14 and its
strict interpretation of rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." '5 The Comisky majority held that orders denying motions to quash
service based on claims of untimely service are subject to interlocutory ap-
peal.
116
In Comisky, a third-party defendant was served with process outside the
120-day provision of rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."7
Additionally, the original defendant in the action provided no good cause for
this delay." l8 In writing the Fourth District's majority opinion, Judge Warner
acknowledged that this decision "depart[s] from all prior precedent."'"' 9 Yet,
109. Id.
110. 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc) (Polen, J., dissenting), rev'd
per curiam, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
111. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.33 1(a) (providing for the determination of issues which threaten
the court system's "uniformity" or are of "exceptional importance"). En banc proceedings are
decided by a majority of the judges, whereas appeals are generally decided by a panel of three
judges. Id.
112. Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 629.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 629-30.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 630.
117. Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 630.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 629. See generally Khandjian v. Compagnie Financiere Mediterranee Cofimed,
S.A., 619 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); DCA of Hialeah, Inc. v. Lago Grande One
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he reasoned that Morales, which was decided in 1992, authorized this change
because untimely service of process without good cause was adequate to
warrant dismissal of the party. 2 ' Additionally, Judge Warner opined that
failure to serve process within the 120 day time limit goes to the
sufficiency of the service of process, and thus the validity of the
process to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, an
order denying a motion to dismiss on those grounds determines the
jurisdiction of the person and is appealable."2 '
Thus, Judge Warner believed that the time provision of the limit provided by
rule 1.0700) was essential to perfecting service of process because the rule
went to its "validity."'
2 2
Additionally, Judge Warner based part of the opinion on the fact that
rule 1.0706) mirrors it's corresponding rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.123 Thus, it should follow that a survey of federal rulings on this
issue is applicable as the Supreme Court of Florida performed in Morales. 24
Indeed, federal case law 25 was construed to support the Comisky majority
position that timeliness of process was an essential element of jurisdiction of
the person. 26
In his dissent, Judge Polen surveyed Florida precedent on this issue and
concluded: "to construe Morales otherwise, without an amendment to rule
9.130 or a decision by the supreme court, would be wholly improper.'
' 27
Additionally, his dissent recognized the distinction between "validity of the
service of process itself ... [and] not merely the timeliness thereof. 1 28 Fi-
nally, Judge Polen argues that to hold that timeliness of service does not con-
stitute jurisdiction of the person and is not, therefore, subject to appellate
Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 559 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Cole v. Posada, 555 So. 2d
367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
120. Comisky, 630 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). "Morales is on point
and requires the dismissal of the complaint as to this appellant." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 629.
123. Id.
124. See Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 629; see also Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 So. 2d
538, 539 (Fla. 1992).
125. McDonald v. United States, 898 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that defective
service outside the 120-day period proscribed by rule 4(j) is insufficient to obtain personal
jurisdiction).
126. Comisky, 629 So. 2d at 629-30.
127. Id.at631.
128. Id.
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jurisdiction, would leave the litigant with a remedy because relief could be
"obtain[ed] through a petition for common law certiorari."' 121
Ultimately, the essence of Judge Polen's dissent became part of the Su-
preme Court of Florida's decision in Thomas.3 ' However, at least for the
time being, Judge Polen's opinion would not solve this issue. Nonetheless,
the ripple caused by Morales was now being felt in other areas: appellate
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals.
C. The Build-Up to Thomas
The issue of what constitutes the parameters of "jurisdiction of the per-
son" pursuant to rule 9.130 was and would continue to be controversial for
some time.'31 In 1994, the Third District Court of Appeal held in Polo v.
Polo'32 that timeliness of service was not an element of personal jurisdiction
for purposes of interlocutory appeal. 133 This decision was consistent with the
Third District's decision the previous year in RD & G Leasing, Inc. v. Steb-
nicki.'34 Yet in 1994, the Fourth and the Fifth District Courts of Appeal ar-
rived at precisely the opposite result. 35
As has already been explored in detail, the Comisky court in the Fourth
District held that timeliness of service of process was an element of "juris-
diction of the person '' 136 pursuant to rule 9.130 and is, therefore, appeal-
able.'37 Likewise, in Mid-Florida Associates, Ltd. v. Taylor,38 the Fifth Dis-
trict based its jurisdiction to hear the appeal of untimely service of process
upon the Comisky court's precedent. 39 In Taylor, the written opinion does
not directly address the jurisdictional issue raised by the opposing statutory
interpretations of the Second and Third Districts. 40 Instead, the Taylor court
claims jurisdiction in a footnote, cites to two cases in favor and two cases
129. Id. at 631-32.
130. See generally Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
131. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
132. 643 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
133. Id. at 56; see also Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice, 20 NOVA. L. REV. 1, 14
(1995).
134. 626 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
135. Id. at 1003; see also Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice, 21 NOVA L. REV. 13, 24
(1996).
136. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
137. See generally Comisky v. Rosen Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (en banc) (Polen, J., dissenting), rev'dper curiam, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
138. 641 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
139. See id.
140. Id. atn.1.
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against the jurisdictional issue, and essentially avoids the controversy. 4' In
1995, the Second District Court of Appeal, in Nowry v. Collyar,142 dismissed
an appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss based on claims for un-
timely service.'43 The Second District recognized the conflict of its decision
with the other circuits.1" Accordingly, the Second District certified the fol-
lowing question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
DOES AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS A
COMPLAINT CLAIMING UNTIMELY SERVICE PURSUANT
TO FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.070(i) FAIL TO
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER DETERMINING THE JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE PERSON, THUS MAKING IT A
NONAPPEALABLE, NON-FINAL ORDER?1
45
Yet at that time, the question was not destined to gain an audience with
the Supreme Court of Florida. 46 Finally, in Novella Land, Inc. v. Panama
City Beach Office Park, Ltd.,47 the First District Court of Appeal recognized
this conflict, as well. 4 8 The court in Novella agreed with the Second and
Third Districts, and held "an order which denies a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to timely serve a defendant is not an appealable non-final order.'
' 49
However, the court dismissed the certified question in Nowry pursuant
to rule 9.350(b) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure5 ° Thus, for the
moment, the conflict concerning the definition of jurisdiction of the person
was unresolved.
D. The Nowry Inquiry Revived
Finally, in 1997, a dispute arose in which the Supreme Court of Florida
was afforded the opportunity to resolve whether claims of timeliness of ser-
vice constitute questions of personal jurisdiction pursuant to rule 9.130 of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.5' In Thomas v. Silvers,12 the Third
141. Id.
142. 666 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
143. Id. at 556.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Nowry v. Collyar, 670 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1996) (table decision).
147. 662 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
148. Id. at 743.
149. Id. at 744.
150. Nowry, 670 So. 2d at 939.
151. Thomas v. Silvers, 701 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997), affd 748 So. 2d 263
(Fla. 1999).
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District Court of Appeal granted the appellee's motion to dismiss an appeal
for claims of untimely service as defined by rule 1.070(i) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure.53 In a per curiam opinion, the court based its deci-
sion on a mixture of statutory interpretation of rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) 154 of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and on Third District precedent.155
The court concluded that untimely service does not fall within the pa-
rameters of "jurisdiction of the person" pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)( 1).156
Thus, interlocutory orders claiming untimely service are unappealable for
lack of appellate jurisdiction.'57 In doing so, the Third District also certified
conflict with the Fourth and the Fifth Districts.'58 The question originally
certified by the Nowry court would soon be resolved. 5 9
VI. MAKING THE RIPPLE PLACID
A. Thomas v. Silvers
On October 21, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved this long-
standing issue."16 In Thomas v. Silvers,16 1 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that appeals of orders denying motions to quash service based solely on
claims that service was untimely pursuant to rule 1.070(i) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure fall outside the judicially proscribed scope of per-
sonal jurisdiction as provided by rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) of the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure.62 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of
Florida recognized the difficulty presented to appellate courts by litigants
continuously seeking review in the district courts for interlocutory appeals. 163
Specifically, the district courts were forced to review these appeals "piece-
meal."' 64 By their very nature, interlocutory appeals typically occur during a
152. Id.
153. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.070(i); Thomas, 701 So. 2d at 390.
154. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
155. Thomas, 701 So. 2d at 390.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Nowry, 666 So. 2d at 556.
160. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). The Supreme Court of Florida is authorized to, in
its discretion, "review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question
certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is certified by it to be in direct conflict
with a decision of another district court of appeal." Id.
161. 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
162. Id. at 265.
163. Id. at 264.
164. Id.
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trial, allowing such review, in most cases, only "serves to waste court re-
sources and needlessly delay final judgment."'' 65 Thus, the court based its
opinion on the public policy grounds previously articulated in Travelers In-
surance Co. v. Bruns.166 However, the manner in which this court arrived at
this ultimate conclusion involves substantial creativity and deserves further
explanation.
The dilemma faced by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bruns was how
to manage and limit the crushing workload faced by the district courts while
simultaneously providing efficient and equitable relief from erroneous trial
court rulings. 167 In crafting a solution to this problem, this court utilized its
inherent power afforded by the Florida Constitution in two ways.
68
First, the court utilized its ability to resolve conflict.' 69 This power is
afforded to the Supreme Court of Florida by the Florida Constitution. 7 This
court could have merely held that denials of motions to quash service based
on claims of untimely service do not constitute jurisdiction of the person
pursuant to rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
stopped there.' 7' However, taken alone, such a holding might unfairly preju-
dice defendants because they would have no redress until a final judgment
had been entered. In this light, such a ruling could be construed as unduly
plaintiff friendly. Instead, the Supreme Court of Florida went a step fur-
ther."'72
Second, as the Supreme Court of Florida is authorized to promulgate its
own court rules, 173 the opinion noted a recent amendment to the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure."' The practical effect of this amendment is to
augment the discretion of trial judges and encourage them to dismiss parties
who have been improperly served. 75 Thus, defendants should be dismissed
for untimely service more frequently, and never have to appeal the decision
165. Id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 1984)).
166. Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 264; see Bruns, 443 So. 2d at 960-61.
167. See Bruns, 433 So. 2d at 960-61.
168. Id.
169. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
170. Id.; see also FLA. R. App. P. 9.125(a) (providing for direct appeals of trial court rul-
ings by the District Courts of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida for questions either
having "great public importance or hav[ing] a great effect on the proper administration of
justice throughout the state").
171. SeeFLA. R. APp.P. 9.130.
172. See Bruns, 433 So. 2d at 960-61.
173. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (authorizing the Supreme Court of Florida to write court
rules).
174. Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 1999).
175. Id.
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at all.' 76 The history and policy underlying this amended rule deserve further
discussion.
B. Amendment to Rule 1.0706)
Eleven months before Thomas was decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida, the court published Amendment to the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 1.0 70 0) Time Limit for Service.17 7 In this proposal, the Supreme Court
of Florida relaxed the harshness of the current rule's mandate which "some-
times acts as a severe sanction."'178 This sanction was severe because "even
if dismissal under the rule is without prejudice, a plaintiff would be unable to
refile suit in cases where the statute of limitations had expired."' 79 The new
rule would allow "a court broad discretion to extend the time for service even
when good cause has not been shown."' 8° This change is crucial because
defendants can use claims of untimely service to evade entirely the courts'
jurisdiction.
Seven months before Thomas was decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida, the court amended the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. On March
4, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida published Amendment to Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.0700) Time Limit for Service.'8' This adopted amend-
ment provided:
(j) Summons; Time Limit. If service of the initial process and ini-
tial pleading is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after
filing of the initial pleading.., the court, on its own initiative after
notice or on motion, shall direct that service be effected within a
specified time or shall dismiss the action.., without prejudice or
drop that defendant.., as a party ... provided that if the plaintiff
shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure, the court
shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. A dis-
missal under this subdivision shall not be considered a voluntary
176. Id. at 264-65.
177. 720 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1998). This proposed amendment was published in the Florida
Bar News. Id. at 506. The court sought "any comments on the proposed rule within thirty
days of the date of publication." Id. Specifically, the court asked for input from "the Florida
Bar Civil Procedure Rules Committee and interested persons." Id.
178. Id. at 505.
179. Amend. to Fla. Rule of Civil Proc. 1.0700) Time Limit for Service, 720 So. 2d 505
(Fla. 1998).
180. Id.
181. 746 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1999).
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dismissal or operate as an adjudication on the merits under rule
1.420(a)(1)."'8
As articulated in the proposal, the practical effect of this amendment is
to afford trial judges greater discretion in quashing service of process on
improperly served parties.'83 Yet there are other important considerations.
This paper argues that another policy reason supports the equity of this
decision. This policy was articulated after Thomas was decided, but was
perhaps still an unwritten factor that determined the ultimate outcome of
Thomas.14 This reasoning goes to the essence of what personal jurisdiction
is and what it is not.
C. Totura & Co. v. Williams
On February 17, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Totura &
Co. v. Williams.'85 Although the issue in Williams centered on Florida's rela-
tion-back doctrine,' 86 the policies underlying this decision are applicable in
the context of timely service of process because both issues center on rule
1.070j)187 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
In resolving the conflict of Williams, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that rule 1.0700) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure "is intended to be
'a case management tool, not an additional statute of limitations cutting off
liability of a tortfeasor."" 88 This notion is well supported by rule 1.010 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure'8 9 and is substantially buttressed by
previous holdings. 9 ' In this connection, once a case is filed, the statute of
limitations is tolled, and allowing a party to escape litigation for failing to
serve process in a timely fashion would cause "technical defenses [to] be-
182. Id.
183. Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 264.
184. See generally id. at 263.
185. 754 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2000).
186. Id. at 672.
187. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.0700).
188. Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678 (quoting Root v. Little, 721 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
189. FLA .R. CIV. P. 1.010 ("These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.").
190. See Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1993) (identifying the purpose as
"encourag[ing] the orderly movement of litigation"); Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946
(Fla. 1983) ("The purpose of the rules of civil procedure is to promote the orderly movement
of litigation."); Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701, 704-05 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) ("The purpose of the rules of civil procedure is to promote the orderly movement
of litigation.") (quoting Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 946).
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come the centerpiece of the litigation . *..."' In that situation, "the merits
are obscured, if not totally overshadowed." 192 Thus, if the time limit pro-
vided by rule 1.0700) is a "'case management tool," ' 193 then it is not truly an
element of personal jurisdiction.
This distinction is precisely why the underlying policy of Williams is
applicable to Thomas. Just because rule 1.0700) of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure prescribes a time limit to effect valid service of process, 94 it
does not mean that failure to comply with the time requirements constitutes a
question of jurisdiction of the person. It merely constitutes an issue of judi-
cial administration in the form of case management. This logic was the same
erroneous logic employed by Comisky:195 to consider untimely service as
invalid may be correct, but to consider untimely service as a jurisdictional
question is essentially to mistakenly view a rule designed to be "'a case man-
agement tool,""' .9 6 as an element of personal jurisdiction. Thus, for the mo-
ment, the ripple created by Comisky is placid.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Thomas was correct and embodies sound judicial poli-
cies. Time limits on service do not equate to true legal power. Timeliness of
service of process is not a substantive element of personal jurisdiction be-
cause it fails to go to the essential quality of service of process: notice.
97
Notice is paramount for a court to have jurisdiction or power over a defen-
dant.198 The time limit on service of process is merely a procedural aspect
designed to efficiently move cases through the courts.' 99 Thus, defendants
are properly precluded from using technical claims of untimely service of
process to evade justice.200 Indeed, as articulated in Judge Polen's dissent in
Comisky, a truly unjust result stemming from the issue of timeliness of ser-
vice of process may be corrected by a common law writ of certiorari.'
191. Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 678 (quoting Root v. Little, 721 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
194. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.0700).
195. See generally Comisky v. Rosen Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (en banc) (Polen, J., dissenting), rev'dper curiam, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
196. See generally Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678.
197. See Bedford Computer Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla.
1986).
198. Id.
199. Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678.
200. Id.
201. Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 631-32.
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Case management is an important aspect of judicial administration.2 °2
When questions of personal jurisdiction intersect with questions of appellate
jurisdiction, the situation can be quite complicated. This is especially true
when the judiciary must craft a solution that balances the interests of litigants
203 Thragainst the interests of judicial economy. In Thomas, the Supreme Court
of Florida creatively and equitably solved this issue so that both litigants'
rights and the judicial economy are preserved. Indeed, after Thomas, plain-
tiffs' causes of action are better protected and less interlocutory appeals will
be entertained. In Thomas, the Supreme Court of Florida effectively clarified
the essence of personal jurisdiction through the scope of appellate jurisdic-
tion.
202. Cope, supra note 54, at 62.
203. Id.
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